

European Migration Network

Conference on “Activating the TPD – Retrospect and Ways Forward”

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Forced Migration from Ukraine after 2/2022

Looking back and looking forward

(Reappraisal and future scenarios)

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Premisse

- The war began in 2014.
- The invasion was to be expected since April 2021.
- Russia is analysed an imperial power and the war a colonial war.
- Russia's aggressions cause or contribute much of the global refugee problem (from 1979 - Afghanistan, Chechnya - 1994/99, Syria - 2011 and Ukraine - 2022).
- Since 2015, Russia plays out the refugee card against the EU.
- The EU was complacent.
- Ignorance vis a vis the "Global East".

Question

- Migration outlook, how many Ukrainians will
 - *Stay*
 - *Return*
 - *Move to other countries*
 - *Cause family reunification*

Considerations

- Interests of
 - *country of origin*
 - *host country*
 - *migrants*
 - *migrant families left behind*
 - *trade off between demographic and economic interests of resp. countries*

Starting point

Pre-war conditions

- Population decline in Ukraine since 1991: 7-8 mio., most cities and towns shrinking.
 - Housing market: 2 mio. vacant apartments.
 - High level of property ownership, approx. 95%.
- People with migration aspirations: down from 49% in 2012 to 26% by 2021.
 - Aggression began in 2014, 1.4 mio. IDPs
 - Diaspora: Prior to the war over 2 mio. registered Ukrainians in the EU, EFTA and Turkey, plus Soviet (pre-1999) emigrants of Ukrainian background.
= significant migration network.

Observations since 2/2022

- Roughly 15 mio. people directly affected by invasion, 40% of total population.
 - *Proportion of people fleeing is higher than in 2014, people also fled regions pre-emptively that were not directly affected.*
 - 13 mio. entries / 10 mio. exits to/from EU 2-12/2022.
 - 3.9 mio. registered TP beneficiaries (4.7 mio. 11/2022) (very low proportion is not registered).
 - *Less than 3.5 mio. actual residents (because returnees do not deregister).*
 - False numbers from Russia (2.8 mio.).
 - *IDPs: 5.3 mio., decreasing from 7 mio. in 9/2022 (all overestimated).*
 - Between 32% to 50% of all displaced persons have been seeking protection abroad.
 - High resilience of host countries of Ukrainians.
 - *EU countries experience population ageing and partly shrinking populations, some due to emigration (e.g. Poland, Baltic countries), all enjoy economic growth, report significant job vacancies and relatively quick labour market integration.*
 - No unrest or conflict is reported from any country related to the inflow of Ukrainians.

Phases, Current Situation, Trends, Outlook

- February to April 2022: major outflow, but reverse flows from day one.
 - Since May 2022: pendulum migration, pilot or temporary return.
 - May to September 2022: return migration.
 - Since September 2022: Migration situation stable, no major outflow, no major changes.
 - Winter: bombing campaign on infrastructure, damage quickly repaired, no major outflow.
 - Mid February 2023: fresh offensive (1 mio. affected), fresh displacement but no new outflow.
 - May 2023: bombing campaign on cities, heightened anxiety, no fresh outflow, but return stalled.
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- 3.9 mio. TP beneficiaries (3.2023) plus approx. 2 mio. in Russia, both decreasing
 - 5.4 mio. IDPs, decreasing from 7.7 mio. (30% decrease)
 - 5.6 mio. returnees (2.3 mio. IDPs, 3.3 mio. refugees)
 - Onward migration from Russia (300.000?)
 - Some irregular out-migration, more men leaving Ukraine (?)
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- Summer: return migration
 - Increasing pendular movements / transnational migration
 - End of TBP, more return plus mobility within EU MS

Particularities

- It is an inter-state war.
 - It is a war in Europe.
 - It is a conflict/war with the largest number of combatants and victims.
 - Journeys are short, safe and legal.
 - Majority, 2/3 are women and children.
 - Proximity and security situation facilitates quick and/or repeated return.
 - Temporary protection. Quick labour market integration in some countries.
 - Uncertain future.

Macro-level and micro-level drivers of migration

- (a) duration of the war;
- (b) scope of the destruction;
- (c) proportion of occupied territory;
- (d) Gross Regional Product (GRP), absorption capacity of IDPs in GCA;
- (e) economic outlook of Ukraine, reconstruction efforts and speed thereof;
- (f) family status, forced separation, loss/killing of close family members;
- (g) property and/or business still in Ukraine;
- (h) ethnicity;
- (i) how often displaced;
- (j) duration of stay in the EU;
- (k) legal status in the EU and the related political situation;
- (l) integration in the host community (employment, housing, education);
- (m) need to generate remittances for family members still in Ukraine;
- (n) perceptions of migration and perceptions of Ukraine before and after the war;
- (o) perception of life in the EU.

Map 1: Ukraine, oblasts, population in million, rounded (mio.), scenarios of outcome of war, oblasts GRP per capita rounded in 100,000 UAH (2017) (in italics), Ukraine average 70 UAH and percentage of ethnic Russians (2001)

Scenarios of the War

Short, medium and long-term scenarios




Scenarios of War and Displacement in and from Ukraine

- (A) Russia will be defeated and retreats. Significant western aid will be made available to rebuild Ukraine (pre-2014 situation) (rather unlikely short-term). Migration: <1.65 mio.
- (B) Russia's current invasion will be halted and reversed, at least partly. Significant western aid to rebuild Ukraine (status quo after 2014) (a possibility but less likely). Migration >1.65 mio.
- (C) Russia occupies parts of Donetsk, Lugansk, Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts resulting in yet another frozen conflict. Significant western aid to rebuild the sovereign parts of the country; economic recovery is fast (realistic possibility, short-term). Migration: 3.48 mio.
- (D) Russia occupies all territory east of a line Kyiv-Kherson. Western aid only benefits government-controlled western Ukraine; however, country remains structurally and economically weak (unlikely). Migration: 8 mio.
- (E) Ukraine will be defeated, little reconstruction, no economic recovery (rather unrealistic). Migration: 18.8 mio.
- (F) Protracted war similar to the situation in Syria; reconstruction is stalled, economy remains weak and the security situation remains precarious (unrealistic). Migration >21 mio.

Overview migration scenarios, Ukrainians remaining in EU

Pre-2014	Pre-2022	Donbas occupied	N, E and S occupied	Russia wins	Protracted war
Scenario 1	Scenario 2	Scenario 3	Scenario 4	Scenario 5	Scenario 6
<1.65 mio.	>1.65 mio.	3.48 mio.	4.8 mio.	18.8 mio.	>21 mio.



2.9 mio. stay, plus
580.000 through
family reunification

Recent survey results

- 86% impacted by the war (RG).
- Economic recovery (EP).
- 51% have positive image of state (5% '21) (RG)
- 2/3 rate Ukraine's future prospects very positive (RG)
- Previous surveys suggest that aspiration to stay is increasing
- Migration aspiration EU-wide (FRA, 9/22):
 - *return 35%*
 - *stay 38%*
 - *undecided 23%*
 - *move elsewhere 4%*
- Germany (SOEP, 9/22)
 - *return 47%*
 - *stay 26%*
 - *undecided 27%*
 - *family reunification approx. 50%*
- Ukraine (Ipsos, 10/22)
 - *80% of IDPs wish to return*

Poland (UW, 2/23)

- *32-54% (depending on when)*
- *23%*
- *16%*
- *7% move to another country*

- Elderly and women with children have higher return aspirations.
- The employed have probably lower return aspirations.
- Those who stay are likely to develop family reunification aspirations.

Conclusion: Future migration

Initially, the situation was highly volatile, people are highly mobile and statistics are often misleading. More caution is required.

Current stock 3.5 mio.

- Stay 38% $\hat{=}$ 1.33 mio.
- Return 35% $\hat{=}$ 1.23 mio.
- Undecided $\hat{=}$ 805,000 ($\frac{1}{2}$ stays, $\frac{1}{2}$ returns).

Stay = 1.73 plus family reunification 850.000, total 2.5 mio. (not 3.48 mio.)

Rather fewer stay than initially assumed.

(However, in addition, more labour migration - mostly men - will occur in future.)

For Ukraine, the loss of population is dramatic and we have to find a sensible balance between all competing interests.