European Migration Network

Conference on "Activating the TPD – Retrospect and Ways Forward"

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Forced Migration from Ukraine after 2/2022 Looking back and looking forward (Reappraisal and future scenarios) Dr Franck Düvell (IMIS), Osnabruck University



Premisse

- The war began in 2014.
- The invasion was to be expected since April 2021.
- Russia is analysed an imperial power and the war a colonial war.
- Russia's aggressions cause or contribute much of the global refugee problem (from 1979 - Afghanistan, Chechnya - 1994/99, Syria - 2011 and Ukraine - 2022).
- Since 2015, Russia plays out the refugee card against the EU.
- The EU was complacent.
- Ignorance vis a vis the "Global East".



Question

- Migration outlook, how many Ukrainians will
 - Stay
 - Return
 - Move to other countries
 - Cause family reunification

Considerations

- Interests of
 - country of origin
 - host country
 - migrants
 - migrant families left behind
 - trade off between demographic and economic interests of resp. countries



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Starting point

Pre-war conditions

- Population decline in Ukraine since 1991: 7-8 mio., most cities and towns shrinking.
 - Housing market: 2 mio. vacant apartments.
 - High level of property ownership, approx. 95%.
 - People with migration aspirations: down from 49% in 2012 to 26% by 2021.
 - Aggression began in 2014, 1.4 mio. IDPs
 - Diaspora: Prior to the war over 2 mio. registered Ukrainians in the EU, EFTA and Turkey, plus Soviet (pre-1999) emigrants of Ukrainian background.
 - = significant migration network.



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Observations since 2/2022

- Roughly 15 mio. people directly affected by invasion, 40% of total population.
 - Proportion of people fleeing is higher than in 2014, people also fled regions pre-emptively that were not directly affected.
 - 13 mio. entries / 10 mio. exits to/from EU 2-12/2022.
 - 3.9 mio. registered TP beneficiaries (4.7 mio. 11/2022) (very low proportion is not registered).
 - Less than 3.5 mio. actual residents (because returnees do not deregister).
 - False numbers from Russia (2.8 mio.).
 - IDPs: 5.3 mio., decreasing from 7 mio. in 9/2022 (all overestimated).
 - Between 32% to 50% of all displaced persons have been seeking protection abroad.
 - High resilience of host countries of Ukrainians.
- EU countries experience population ageing and partly shrinking populations, some due to emigration (e.g. Poland, Baltic countries), all enjoy economic growth, report significant job vacancies and relatively quick labour market integration.
 - No unrest or conflict is reported from any country related to the inflow of Ukrainians.



Phases, Current Situation, Trends, Outlook

- February to April 2022: major outflow, but reverse flows from day one.
- Since May 2022: pendulum migration, pilot or temporary return.
- May to September 2022: return migration.
- Since September 2022: Migration situation stable, no major outflow, no major changes.
- Winter: bombing campaign on infrastructure, damage quickly repaired, no major outflow.
- Mid February 2023: fresh offensive (1 mio. affected), fresh displacement but no new outflow.
- May 2023: bombing campaign on cities, heightened anxiety, no fresh outflow, but return stalled.
- 3.9 mio. TP beneficiaries (3.2023) plus approx. 2 mio. in Russia, both decreasing
- 5.4 mio. IDPs, decreasing from 7.7 mio. (30% decrease)
- 5.6 mio. returnees (2.3 mio. IDPs, 3.3 mio. refugees)
- Onward migration from Russia (300.000?)
- Some irregular out-migration, more men leaving Ukraine (?)
- Summer: return migration
- Increasing pendular movements / transnational migration
- End of TBP, more return plus mobility within EU MS



Particularities

- It is an inter-state war.
 - It is a war in Europe.
 - It is a conflict/war with the largest number of combatants and victims.
 - Journeys are short, safe and legal.
 - Majority, 2/3 are women and children.
 - Proximity and security situation facilitates quick and/or repeated return.
 - Temporary protection. Quick labour market integration in some countries.
 - Uncertain future.



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Macro-level and micro-level drivers of migration

(a) duration of the war;

(b) scope of the destruction;

- (c) proportion of occupied territory;
 - (d) Gross Regional Product (GRP), absorption capacity of IDPs in GCA;
 - (e) economic outlook of Ukraine, reconstruction efforts and speed thereof;
 - (f) family status, forced separation, loss/killing of close family members;
 - (g) property and/or business still in Ukraine;

(h) ethnicity;

(i) how often displaced;

(j) duration of stay in the EU;

(k) legal status in the EU and the related political situation;

(I) integration in the host community (employment, housing, education);

(m) need to generate remittances for family members still in Ukraine;


(n) perceptions of migration and perceptions of Ukraine before and after the war;(o) perception of life in the EU.




Map 1: Ukraine, oblasts, population in million, rounded (mio.), scenarios of outcome of war, <u>oblasts GRP</u> per capita rounded in 100,000 UAH (2017) (in italics), Ukraine average 70 UAH and <u>percentage of ethnic Russians</u> (2001)



Short, medium and longterm scenarios





Scenarios of War and Displacement in and from Ukraine

- (A) Russia will be defeated and retreats. Significant western aid will be made available to rebuild Ukraine (pre-2014 situation) (rather unlikely short-term). Migration: <1.65 mio.</p>
 - Russia's current invasion will be halted and reversed, at least partly. Significant western aid to rebuild Ukraine (status quo after 2014) (a possibility but less likely). Migration >1.65 mio.
- (C) Russia occupies parts of Donetsk, Lugansk, Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts resulting in yet another frozen conflict. Significant western aid to rebuild the sovereign parts of the country; economic recovery is fast (realistic possibility, short-term). Migration: 3.48 mio.
- (D) Russia occupies all territory east of a line Kyiv-Kherson. Western aid only benefits governmentcontrolled western Ukraine; however, country remains structurally and economically weak (unlikely).
 Migration: 8 mio.
- (E) Ukraine will be defeated, little reconstruction, no economic recovery (rather unrealistic).
 Migration: 18.8 mio.
- (F) Protracted war similar to the situation in Syria; reconstruction is stalled, economy remains weak and the security situation remains precarious (unrealistic). Migration >21 mio.



 (\mathbf{B})

Overview migration scenarios, Ukrainians remaining in EU

Pre-2014	Pre-2022	Donbas occupied		Russia wins	Protracted war
Scenario 1	Scenario 2	Scenario 3	Scenario4	Scenario 5	Scenario 6
<1.65 mio.	>1.65 mio.	3.48 mio.	4.8 mio.	18.8 mio.	>21 mio.
	:	2.9 mio. stay, plus 580.000 through family reunificatior			



Recent survey results

- 86% impacted by the war (RG).
- Economic recovery (EP).
- 51% have positive image of state (5% '21) (RG)
- 2/3 rate Ukraine's future prospects very positive (RG)
- Previous surveys suggest that aspiration to stay is increasing
- Migration aspiration EU-wide (FRA, 9/22):
 - return 35%
 - stay 38%
 - undecided 23%
 - move elsewhere 4%
- Germany (SOEP, 9/22)
 - *return* 47%
 - stay 26%
 - undecided 27%
 - family reunification approx. 50%
- Ukraine (Ipsos, 10/22)
 - 80% of IDPs wish to return



Institute for Migration Research and Intercultural Studies Poland (UW, 2/23)

- 32-54% (depending on when)
- 23%
- 16%
- 7% move to another country

- Elderly and women with children have higher return aspirations.
- The employed have probably lower return aspirations.
- Those who stay are likely to develop family reunification aspirations.

Conclusion: Future migration

Initially, the situation was highly volatile, people are highly mobile and statistics are often misleading. More caution is required.

Current stock 3.5 mio.

- Stay 38% ≙ 1.33 mio.
- Return 35% \triangleq 1.23 mio.
- Undecided \triangleq 805,000 (½ stays, ½ returns).

Stay = 1.73 plus family reunification 850.000, total 2.5 mio. (not 3.48 mio.)

Rather fewer stay than initially assumed.

(However, in addition, more labour migration - mostly men - will occure in future.)

For Ukraine, the loss of population is dramatic and we have to find a sensible balance between all competing interests.



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